Was the detonation of a French nuclear weapon in the Sahara a desperate attempt to keep an atomic device out of the hands of rebel army officers?  On today’s date in 1961, Foreign Legion paratroopers captured government offices in Algiers, capital of the then French colony of Algeria, marking the opening of one of the most intriguing coup attempts in the 20th century. Three days later the nuclear weapon Gerboise Vert would be exploded in what was billed as a planned test. A draft of a new paper by Bruno Tetrais of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research, however, claims the detonation was far from routine.  According to Tetrais’ research, the order to explode the French nuclear device was transmitted to the desert test site of Reggan from a desperate French leadership under siege in Paris and was followed by an ominous countermanding order from coup leader Maurice Challe: “refrain from detonating your little bomb - keep it for us, it will be … useful.” Tetrais goes on to claim that test site commander Gen. Jean Thiry debated a full day before deciding to support the De Gaulle government and explode Gerboise Vert. Even then, though, the safety of the powerful weapon was far from assured. Concerned that troops assigned to guard the laboratory in which Gerboise Vert was stored would join the rebellion, Thiry had the bomb transported the 50 kilometers to the test site in the trunk of an unguarded Citroen 2CV passenger car, while a decoy convoy of armored trucks left along an opposite route.  In assessing what lessons can be learned from the secret history of the 1961 coup,  Tetrais notes that “nuclear weapons can become instrumental in the consolidation of the primacy of civilian power over the military and of the primacy of the executive over the legislative branch, and of the popular legitimacy of the head of the State.” 
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Was the detonation of a French nuclear weapon in the Sahara a desperate attempt to keep an atomic device out of the hands of rebel army officers? 

On today’s date in 1961, Foreign Legion paratroopers captured government offices in Algiers, capital of the then French colony of Algeria, marking the opening of one of the most intriguing coup attempts in the 20th century. Three days later the nuclear weapon Gerboise Vert would be exploded in what was billed as a planned test. A draft of a new paper by Bruno Tetrais of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research, however, claims the detonation was far from routine. 

According to Tetrais’ research, the order to explode the French nuclear device was transmitted to the desert test site of Reggan from a desperate French leadership under siege in Paris and was followed by an ominous countermanding order from coup leader Maurice Challe: “refrain from detonating your little bomb - keep it for us, it will be … useful.” Tetrais goes on to claim that test site commander Gen. Jean Thiry debated a full day before deciding to support the De Gaulle government and explode Gerboise Vert. Even then, though, the safety of the powerful weapon was far from assured. Concerned that troops assigned to guard the laboratory in which Gerboise Vert was stored would join the rebellion, Thiry had the bomb transported the 50 kilometers to the test site in the trunk of an unguarded Citroen 2CV passenger car, while a decoy convoy of armored trucks left along an opposite route. 

In assessing what lessons can be learned from the secret history of the 1961 coup,  Tetrais notes that “nuclear weapons can become instrumental in the consolidation of the primacy of civilian power over the military and of the primacy of the executive over the legislative branch, and of the popular legitimacy of the head of the State.” 

Could Mali’s coup be beneficial for economic development in the north African state? It’s too soon to tell the political proclivities of the new junta, however, with the putsch executed with what was apparently minimal violence the government has one ideological direction in which it could move to shore-up investments in the nation. We revisit a post we made in 2011 -  As rumbling of an impending military coup in Greece continues to grow, we visit a 2004 paper by Dr. Catherine Duggan of Harvard Business School in which she asks the question “How do coups affect private investment?” While conventional wisdom indicates a military intervention into civil government tends to depress investments in the country in question, Dr. Duggan finds that - depending on the coup type - a net benefit can often be realized. Duggan’s research indicates a bloodless coup by a right-oriented junta tracks an average 7.7% increase in aggregate private investments as a percent of GDP.
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Could Mali’s coup be beneficial for economic development in the north African state? It’s too soon to tell the political proclivities of the new junta, however, with the putsch executed with what was apparently minimal violence the government has one ideological direction in which it could move to shore-up investments in the nation. We revisit a post we made in 2011 - 

As rumbling of an impending military coup in Greece continues to grow, we visit a 2004 paper by Dr. Catherine Duggan of Harvard Business School in which she asks the question “How do coups affect private investment?” While conventional wisdom indicates a military intervention into civil government tends to depress investments in the country in question, Dr. Duggan finds that - depending on the coup type - a net benefit can often be realized. Duggan’s research indicates a bloodless coup by a right-oriented junta tracks an average 7.7% increase in aggregate private investments as a percent of GDP.

As nations large and small are rocked by rumors of military coups, or actual coups themselves, we revisit a post we made last year highlighting the release of the Uppsala Coup Event Dataset.  Uppsala Coup Event Dataset Researchers at Uppsala University in Sweden have recently released the Uppsala Coup Event Dataset. Combining information from more than 400 coups d’etat and overthrow plots covering the time period 1950-2010, the dataset finds that foreign support for the coups and coup attempts experienced by many nations has, historically, been limited, noting that “the typical case … seems to be a coup-like attempt at overthrowing the government, using domestically recruited armed men led by a disenfranchised domestic elite person like a retired officer, an opposition leader, an ex-minister or ex-president. To be successful they may in the end need the tacit consent of parts of the state security apparatus …”  Other findings of the dataset include:  the three most likely regions to experience a coup d’etat were Africa, Asia and the Americas with Europe and the Middle East least likely to experience a coup the overwhelming majority of incumbents targeted in coup plots either survive the coup to remain in power or remain free in the country, though rendered powerless; 15% are exiled, another 15% are imprisoned, and 5% killed the most likely “inside” instigators of a coup were, in this order: the regular armed forces, cabinet members, “special” military units (e.g. presidential escort regiments, Republican Guards, etc.) while regular police, political police and gendarmerie/paramilitary forces were least likely to be involved in coup attempts
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As nations large and small are rocked by rumors of military coups, or actual coups themselves, we revisit a post we made last year highlighting the release of the Uppsala Coup Event Dataset. 

Uppsala Coup Event Dataset

Researchers at Uppsala University in Sweden have recently released the Uppsala Coup Event Dataset. Combining information from more than 400 coups d’etat and overthrow plots covering the time period 1950-2010, the dataset finds that foreign support for the coups and coup attempts experienced by many nations has, historically, been limited, noting that “the typical case … seems to be a coup-like attempt at overthrowing the government, using domestically recruited armed men led by a disenfranchised domestic elite person like a retired officer, an opposition leader, an ex-minister or ex-president. To be successful they may in the end need the tacit consent of parts of the state security apparatus …” 

Other findings of the dataset include: 

  • the three most likely regions to experience a coup d’etat were Africa, Asia and the Americas with Europe and the Middle East least likely to experience a coup
  • the overwhelming majority of incumbents targeted in coup plots either survive the coup to remain in power or remain free in the country, though rendered powerless; 15% are exiled, another 15% are imprisoned, and 5% killed
  • the most likely “inside” instigators of a coup were, in this order: the regular armed forces, cabinet members, “special” military units (e.g. presidential escort regiments, Republican Guards, etc.) while regular police, political police and gendarmerie/paramilitary forces were least likely to be involved in coup attempts
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The dismissal, earlier this week, of the general staff of the Greek armed forces may have mitigated the possibility of a military coup but appears to have done little to keep Prime Minister Papandreou’s job safe from more symmetrical challenges. Still, does the possibility of an extra-constitutional seizure of power exist even with a neutered military? Uppsala University’s definitive Uppsala Coup Event Dataset tracks nearly 600 instances of coup attempts in the last century. If international data averages are applied against Greece, we find the second most likely instigator of a coup attempt would be Papandreou’s own cabinet. Less likely instigators (again, using international averages) would include the Proedriki Froura (President Karolos Papoulias’ escort troops) and the civil police while the the NIS-EYP (counterintelligence service) and the “Units for the Reinstatement of Order” are very unlikely to initiate a takeover attempt. (The latter group, a de-militarized successor to the former Greek gendarmerie, is considered highly politically reliable and, specifically, party loyal to Papandreou’s ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement.)
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The dismissal, earlier this week, of the general staff of the Greek armed forces may have mitigated the possibility of a military coup but appears to have done little to keep Prime Minister Papandreou’s job safe from more symmetrical challenges. Still, does the possibility of an extra-constitutional seizure of power exist even with a neutered military? Uppsala University’s definitive Uppsala Coup Event Dataset tracks nearly 600 instances of coup attempts in the last century. If international data averages are applied against Greece, we find the second most likely instigator of a coup attempt would be Papandreou’s own cabinet. Less likely instigators (again, using international averages) would include the Proedriki Froura (President Karolos Papoulias’ escort troops) and the civil police while the the NIS-EYP (counterintelligence service) and the “Units for the Reinstatement of Order” are very unlikely to initiate a takeover attempt. (The latter group, a de-militarized successor to the former Greek gendarmerie, is considered highly politically reliable and, specifically, party loyal to Papandreou’s ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement.)

An armored roadblock in front of the Acropolis during the last military coup in Greece (from the May 5, 1967 edition of LIFE). Fearing an imminent overthrow of the government, Prime Minister Papendreou today sacked the entire general staff of the armed forces. As we’ve previously noted, certain flavors of coups d’etat have been shown to be positive for flailing economies. A bloodless coup by a right-oriented junta tracks an average 7.7% increase in aggregate private investments as a percent of GDP.
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An armored roadblock in front of the Acropolis during the last military coup in Greece (from the May 5, 1967 edition of LIFE).

Fearing an imminent overthrow of the government, Prime Minister Papendreou today sacked the entire general staff of the armed forces. As we’ve previously noted, certain flavors of coups d’etat have been shown to be positive for flailing economies. A bloodless coup by a right-oriented junta tracks an average 7.7% increase in aggregate private investments as a percent of GDP.